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Abstract— We address the problem of securing the route discovery 
in mobile ad hoc networks, proposing a light-weight yet robust 
routing protocol, the Distance-Vector Secure Routing Protocol  
(DV-SRP). DV-SRP discovers on-demand multiple routes, which 
are established across the network, without providing explicitly the 
network connectivity. DV-SRP combines the advantages of the type 
of route discovery first introduced by AODV, with security and thus 
resilience to adversaries that disrupt the route discovery. Compared 
to previous proposals in the literature to secure the AODV-like 
route discovery, DV-SRP is either more robust, or more efficient, or 
more general. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Independently of security considerations, a multitude of 
routing protocols has been proposed, with a number of those 
heading towards standardization through the MANET WG [2]. 
Different protocols are shown to be appropriate for different 
network settings, and, clearly, there may not be a single 
protocol that outperforms all alternative ones in all settings.  
Our focus in this paper is the reactive route discovery that 
resembles the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
protocol [1], whose operation can be advantageous: nodes 
maintain information only for destinations they actively 
communicate with, and the network overhead per route request 
and reply packet does not increase with the number of nodes 
along a discovered route. From a different point of view, 
another advantage is the improved concealment of topological 
knowledge, as the control and data packets do not carry the 
links of the discovered or utilized routes.  
What we are after here is to ensure the correctness of the 
route discovery. Two proposals in the literature secure the 
AODV-like route discovery. The Secure AODV (S-AODV) [5] 
is a secure version of AODV, proposing a combination of 
public key cryptography and hash chains. The Authenticated 
Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [4] is a secure protocol 
that resembles somewhat AODV, but it does not seek to 
provide AODV’s features.  
In this paper, we propose the Distance-Vector Secure 
Routing Protocol (DV-SRP), which is either more robust, or 
more efficient, or more general than previous proposals to 
secure this type of route discovery. DV-SRP prevents 
adversaries from manipulating the length (hop count) of the 
discovered routes, uses primarily symmetric key and thus low 
cost cryptographic primitives, and discovers multiple routes. 
Next, we discuss the network and adversary models. Then we 
present the operation of DV-SRP, followed by an analysis and 
discussion. 
 
II. NETWORK AND ADVERSARY MODEL 
 
A network node is a process with a unique identity V, a 
public/private key pair EV, DV, a module implementing the 
networking protocols, such as DV-SRP, and a module 
providing communication across a wireless network interface, 
e.g., based on the widely adopted IEEE 802.11 [7]. We are 
concerned with pair-wise communication across multiple 
wireless links between a source S and a destination T. We 
denote S and T as the end nodes, and nodes that assist the S, T 
communication as intermediate nodes. We assume that each 
end-node knows the identity and the public key of its peer end-
node, and all nodes know the identities and the public keys of 
their neighbors. These, as well as the establishment of 
symmetric shared keys by the end nodes or two neighbors, can 
be achieved by protocols such as the Neighbor Lookup 
Protocol (NLP) or mechanisms that are part of the Secure 
Routing Protocol (SRP) [13], [8], [3].  
We consider two models of active adversaries, independent 
adversaries and arbitrary adversaries [13]. Independent 
adversaries can modify, forge, or replay routing or data 
packets, but ignore received traffic that does not comply with 
the operation of the networking protocols, and thus do not 
generate any message due to the receipt of such traffic. Any 
message that does not follow the expected, protocol-specific 
format or fails one of the protocol checks is deemed as non-
compliant. We emphasize that traffic is non-compliant if and 
only if the receiving node can detect that a message does not 
comply with the protocol; otherwise, messages that appear to 
be compliant, but actually are not, are processed as compliant. 
If non-compliant traffic is attributed to misbehavior, 
independence implies that adversaries do not process and relay 
traffic that appears to originate from or have been previously 
relayed by an adversary. In other words, independent 
adversaries do not attempt to assist other adversaries mounting 
an attack, either by ignoring the attack and further relaying 
traffic or by not responding to received non-compliant traffic.  
This model of failures allows for a range of malicious 
behaviors and it is more general than crash, omission failures, 
and timing failures [10], [11]. Even though the malicious 
behavior of independent adversaries is constrained, the model 
does not prevent adversaries from simultaneously launching 
their attacks, which may have a compound effect. As it will 
become clear, the model of independent adversaries serves as a 
necessary condition to achieve stronger protocol properties 
than those achieved without the model’s constraint on the 
adversarial behavior. 
In general, adversarial nodes are allowed to deviate from 
the protocol execution in an arbitrary manner [12]. Arbitrary 
adversaries can be more sophisticated and powerful than 
independent adversaries, having, for example, knowledge of 
the identities of other adversaries in the network, devoting 
resources (e.g., route discovery) to establish direct and possibly 
private communication with other adversaries, and exchanging 
traffic and information about their local execution of the 
protocol. 
 
III. DISTANCE VECTOR SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL  
 
The source node (S) generates a route query or route 
request packet (RREQ). The route request fields include S, T, a 
query identifier Q that was not previously used, and an 
authenticator SINA  to authenticate S as the origin of the RREQ 
at each intermediate node. Moreover, the maximum node count 
field, MNC, is set to a protocol-selectable positive integer 
value, and the maximum hop count field is set to 
MHC=hMNC(x0). 1 An authenticator A=fK(S, T, Q, SINA , MHC) 
is calculated as a function of the route query fields and a key 
K.2 Finally, the node count field is set to NC=1, and the hop 
count field to HC=h(x0).  
S transmits the route request, i.e., broadcasts it, and 
initializes an empty ForwardList for each RREQ it generates, 
and retains NC and HC. S adds to the ForwardList each 
neighbor V it overhears relaying RREQ with NC=NC+1, and 
HC=h(HC). If either of the previous two equalities does not 
hold, S ignores the RREQ. Each node receiving a RREQ 
determines if its own identity matches the sought destination.  
                                                           
1   h is a one-way function and x0 is a random number. 
2 The function f and the key depend on the cryptographic 
primitives. Similarly to SRP [3], K can be a symmetric key 
shared by S and T. 
Each intermediate node Vk invokes the 
PreviouslySeen(RREQ) routine3 to specify if RREQ must be 
processed. If not, the RREQ is discarded. Then, Vk checks if 
NC ≥ MNC, and if hMNC-NC(HC)=MHC. If either test fails, or if 
Validate( SINA ) returns false, it discards RREQ. Otherwise, Vk 
retains the address of its precursor Vk-1,4 it updates NC=NC+1, 
and HC=h(HC), and relays RREQ further. Finally, Vk initializes 
an empty ForwardList for each RREQ it relays. It then adds to 
the ForwardList only each neighbor V it overhears relaying 
RREQ with NC=NC+1 and HC=h(HC).  
Once the RREQ reaches the destination, T invokes the 
PreviouslySeen(RREQ) routine to check if RREQ has been 
previously processed. If so, the RREQ is discarded. Then, T 
checks if NC≥MNC, and if so, whether hMNC-NC(HC)=MHC. It 
then invokes Validate( SINA ), it calculates fK(S, T, Q, AIN, MHC) 
and compares it to A; if any of the checks fails, T discards 
RREQ. Otherwise, T retains its predecessor, generates and 
returns a route reply to S. 
The route reply (RREP) packet fields comprise S, T, Q, and 
the route length is set to RL=NC+1, with NC the value of the 
RREQ field. Moreover, values assigned to: (i) a (reverse) hop 
count field, RHC=h(y0), (ii) a maximum hop count field, 
MHC=hRL(y0), and (iii) a (reverse) node count field, RNC=1. 
Finally, RREP includes a (random not previously used) route 
identifier, routeID, and an authenticator TINA  to authenticate T as 
the origin of the RREP at each intermediate node, and an 
authenticator A′ = fK(S, T, Q, RL, TINA , MHC). The destination 
transmits the RREP to its neighbor, i.e., the first entry of the 
Route list Vn-1.  
Each Vk, including S, verifies that its successor5 
Vk+1∈ForwardList. It checks if RNC≥RL, if hRL-RNC(RHC) 
=MHC, and if RL-RNC=NCk, with NCk the value Vk used when 
the node relayed the corresponding RREQ. If any of the checks 
fails, or if Validate( TINA ) returns false, Vk discards RREP. 
Otherwise, it retains its successor Vk+1 and routeID, it updates 
RHC=h(RHC) and RNC=RNC+1, and relays RREP to Vk-1. 
Once RREP reaches the source, S calculates fK(S, T, Q, RL, 
T
INA , MHC) and compares it to A′ . If there is not a match, S 
rejects the reply. Otherwise, it accepts the reply. 
                                                           
3 The PreviouslySeen( ) routine can be implemented in 
different ways, trading off robustness for lower routing 
overhead, defining different query propagation mechanisms. 
For DV-SRP, only a single copy of each query identified by 
the S, T, Q triplet is relayed, as long all protocol-specific 
checks succeed, by each intermediate node. We denote this as 
the QueryPropagation1 mechanism. When invoked at the 
destination, PreviouslySeen( ) returns true if the RREQ is 
received from a different neighbor. 
4 The node that previously relayed the RREQ that is now 
processed.  
5  The node that relayed the RREP that is now processed.  
Finally, we discuss the calculation of the SINA  and TINA  
authenticators. Those could be digital signatures, even though 
this would be computationally expensive. To mitigate this cost, 
a digital signature can be used only during the first route 
discovery, along with a commitment to a hash chain, hx(z0), 
with z0 a random number. Then, for the i-th RREQ, S appends 
hx-i(z0) to the RREQ packet, and all intermediate nodes verify 
that hi(hx-i(z0)) equals the initial commitment. Similarly, T 
commits to a hash and uses its elements for intermediate nodes 
to authenticate the origin of the RREP. To ensure that all 
network nodes received the hash chain commitment, S can 
periodically rebroadcast a signed RREQ with a commitment to 
some hx-j(z0) element; this way, nodes that previously received 
the commitment can perform a low cost verification (check, in 
the worst case, if hj(hx-j(z0)) equals hx(z0)), and those that have 
not, can validate the signature. The hash chain solution, unlike 
the digital signatures, does not provide integrity of the RREP 
and RREQ, with the intermediate nodes possibly relaying 
corrupted packets. However, such corruption can is eventually 
detected by the end nodes. 
 
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
DV-SRP ensures that in the presence of arbitrary 
adversaries no loop includes correct intermediate nodes, and 
that the route reply is generated by the destination within a (t1, 
t2) interval, where t1 is the time at which S generated the route 
query and t2 the point in time at which S received the route 
reply. This implies that a route along which the RREQ and 
RREP propagated existed in the network. If not, S would have 
never received RREP. However, two or more arbitrary 
adversaries M1 and M2 can ‘tunnel’ RREQ, RREP packets to 
each other across multiple hops. Moreover, with M1, M2,…, 
Mk, k≥2, arbitrary adversaries forming a path, any of the M2,…, 
Mk-1, (in general, k>2) may deviate from the protocol, and relay 
protocol packets while not performing the required checks. As 
a result, in the first case, the number of hops between M1 and 
M2, and, in the latter case, k-2 hops between M1 and Mk can be 
‘hidden’ or ‘inflated’ by the adversaries.  
In the presence of independent adversaries, DV-SRP 
provides stronger properties. The number of hops of the 
discovered route is correct at the source node: an adversary M 
cannot decrease or avoid increasing the route length, and it 
cannot increase the hop length. 
A decrease or no-increase of the length is prevented, 
because one of M’s predecessors will discard the corresponding 
RREP. The increase of the route length is prevented because M 
has to relay RREQ with the correct HC and NC fields. To 
further illustrate this, M could first relay a QRRE ′  with 
‘inflated’ HC and NC, so that QRRE ′  is relayed by M’s 
successor (Recall that QureyPropagation1, defined in Footnote 
3, is used by DV-SRP). Then, M relays a RREQ with field 
values its predecessor deems compliant and then, and later M 
relays the incorrect PRRE ′ . However, M’s predecessor can 
‘blacklist’ M because of QRRE ′ , and ignore (discard) any 
RREP from M bearing the same query identifier with QRRE ′ . 
 Regarding the two types of attacks a group (of two or 
more) arbitrary adversaries could mount, for independent 
adversaries, M3, for example, ignores any non-compliant RREQ 
it receives from M2, and similarly for the tunneling attack, M2 
(M1) ignores traffic received from M1 (M2) as non compliant. In 
general, in the presence of independent adversaries, 
If TINA   prevents modification of any field other than RHC 
and RNC (which is the case for A′ ), the intermediate nodes 
can obtain the correct hop count to the destination. However, 
an intermediate node Vk cannot have the correct length of the 
route prefix, because any Vk-i can manipulate the NC, HC, and 
MHC fields, causing, nevertheless, either T to discard RREQ 
or, later, Vk-i-1 to discard RREP.  
The SINA  and TINA  authenticators prevent two (arbitrary) 
adversaries to forge RREQ and RREP respectively and mislead 
intermediate nodes to establish ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ 
routes, that is, routes towards the adversary that relayed the 
RREQ and RREP respectively. With such an attack, adversaries 
could simply overflow the routing tables of correct nodes, and 
prevent additional routes to be established across such nodes. 
To fully thwart such attacks, each intermediate node relays at 
most n RREP’s per neighbor per query, with n a protocol-
selectable parameter, given that all protocol checks for such 
RREP’s are successful. At the same time, intermediate nodes 
service RREP packets from different neighbors in a round-
robin manner to ensure that even if one adversary transmits 
replies at a fast rate, legitimate ones will also be relayed.  
Finally, consider the following case: an adversary M fully 
complies with the RREQ propagation rules, and later receives a 
RREP from W to V, with V, in turn, bound to relay RREP to its 
predecessor U. Then, if M is a neighbor to both W and U, it 
might relay the RREP before V. This would result in a 
structurally intact route, which, nevertheless, includes an 
adversary. To prevent such an attack, nodes relaying a RREP 
can encrypt the routeID using neighbor-to-neighbor symmetric 
keys [8]. In general, to counter adversaries complying with the 
secure route discovery to place themselves on a route,  
protocols such as the Secure Message Transmission (SMT) and 
the or the Secure Single Path (SSP) protocols are necessary [6]. 
Compared to S-AODV, DV-SRP prevents an independent 
adversary M from increasing the hop count, and also prevents 
such an adversary from ‘rushing’ an overheard legitimate 
RREP, that is, relay it to some node U before U’s successor V. 
Compared to ARAN, which discovers only one route based on 
the first-received route reply, DV-SRP is more general, as it 
provides the correct length of the route in the presence of 
independent adversaries, and it discovers multiple routes. 
Compared to both protocols, DV-SRP is more efficient, as it 
makes limited use of public key cryptography, but rather relies 
primarily on symmetric key primitives that incur roughly three 
to four orders of magnitude lower processing overhead. We 
note that DV-SRP, as well as S-AODV and ARAN, require 
authentication of the end nodes at all intermediate nodes 
handling RREQ and RREP packets, unlike SRP [3]. Moreover, 
we note that neither DV-SRP nor S-AODV or ARAN can ensure 
that routes are link- or node- disjoint, a useful feature for multi-
path data forwarding [9]. 
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